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In the Supreme Court
Of the State of Utah
ROBERT B. S\V" ANER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
UNION MORTGAGE COMPA·NY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 6234

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered against
appellant and in favor of plaintiff, and the facts over
which the litigation resulting in such appeal arose are
contained in the following:
STATEMENT
The plaintiff and respondent, Robert B. Swaner, is
a young man 22 years of age venturing into the contracting and building field. His experience consists of re_modeling and building some eight or nine houses, and
the defendant and appellant is a corporation engaged,
among other things, in financing building loans and securing Federal Housing Administration insurance on
such loans.
In the month of July, 1938 Swaner applied to defendant for Federal Housing Administration insurance
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commitments upon a loan for $4,000.00, hereinafter referred to as the lOth Avenue property, and asked the defendant to provide for appraisals, credit reports, initial
service charges, recording fees, abstracting and fire insurance, in order that such application would in all respects meet the terms and conditions and comply with the
rules and regulations of said Federal Housing Administration. Thereafter, on or about the 20th of July, 1938
the Federal Housing Administration approved such loan,
subject to the qualification that George B. Swaner, father of the plaintiff, should be a co-signer on the note and
mortgage evidencing and insuring the payment of such
loan, and the note and mortgage duly secured as requested were executed and delivered on the 22nd day of
July, 1938.
Thereafter, Swaner began work on the property described in such mortgage and the defendant, in compliance with the terms and conditions of its contract, advanced money upon the order of the plaintiff to material
men and laborers as such improvements proceeded, which
were approved by the Federal Housing Administration,
until the advancements had approximated $2,800.00.
On or about September 15, 1938 Swaner made application to the defendant to obtain three additional
Feder~l Housing Administration loans for $3,000.00 each.
Each loan was to be evidenced by the note of the plaintiff
and be secured by a mortgage on the property described
by plaintiff in his application. Immediately defendant
and appellant presented such applications to the F. H. A.
people and, at plaintiff's request, made advancements and
expenditures in his behalf. On November 6, 1938, as the
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result of its efforts in such behalf, the Federal Housing
Administration approved one loan upon the property
described in plaintiff's complaint (see abstract, page 2)
and hereinafter referred to as the 16th East property,
conditioned that George B. Swaner and Charlotte L.
·swaner, father and mother of the plaintiff, should become co-signers thereon ; and on the 11th day of N ovember, 1938 the note and mortgage so required were made
and executed under the terms and conditions required by
the Federal Housing Administration, among which were·
that the construction should be according to F. H. A.
requirements and should pass inspection by the Federal
Housing Administration. In addition, at the time said
application was made, the defendant was required to and
did make certain expenditures in behalf of plaintiff and
was required to and did carry insurance upon the improvements upon the property.
Shortly after the note and mortgage last above described were made and executed and before any work or
improvements were made upon such 16th East property
by plaintiff, defendant was advised that plaintiff was
failing to comply with the terms and conditions of the
Federal Housing Administration rules and regulations
in that he was not keeping the property referred to in the
note and mortgage of July 22, 1938 the lOth avenue property free from debt, except for the mortgage above referred to, and that he was failing to keep the property
free from claims and that he hadn't paid accruing bills
thereon, and that several material men and mechanics
had already filed liens against such property; that he
was failing to pay his wages and that complaint had
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been made to the Industrial Commission of Utah by laborers who had not been paid. That thereupon defendant
advised plaintiff of the circumstances and plaintiff immediately informed defendant that he would at once put the
first above described loan back into condition so that it
might be finally approved by the Federal Housing Administration. As the result of such representation, this
defendant made additional advances on the construction
of the lOth Avenue property, the last advancement of
which occurred on the 23rd of December, 1938. Plaintiff,
however, failed to keep his agreement, and there was
much difficulty encountered with respect to the first loan
and this defendant found that plaintiff was a bad credit
risk, and it became desirable to discontinue the relations·hip.
Sometime prior to December, 1938 plaintiff began
construction under the mortgage dated November 14,
1938. In the meantime, at the request of plaintiff, defendant had expended in behalf of plaintiff on such mortgage and Federal Housing Administration commitment
16th East property the appraisal fee of $10.00, the credit
report of $6.00, a recording fee of $7 .10, an abstract fee
of $5.00, and had placed fire insurance oil the property
under the terms of the Federal Housing Administration
commitment, with the loss payable to defendant and its
assigns as its interest appeared, and had paid therefor
the sum of $21.00.
When defendant found that plaintiff was not complying with his agreement on the transaction designated
as· the lOth Avenue property, it indicated to the plaintiff
that it was no longer interested in doing business with the
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plaintiff. The plaintiff made demands upon defendant
and appellant for advancements for expenditures incurred by him with respect to the property described as the
16th East property.
That on or about the time the mortgage of November
14, 1938, the 16th East property, was signed and executed,
defendant agreed with plaintiff that advancement would
be made approved Federal Housing Administration inspection, as follows: 10% when the first floor joists were
on, 15% when the roof was done, $20.00 when the house
was ready for plastering, 25% when it was ready for decoration, and the balance when it had passed the final
F. H. A. inspection.
During the period between the time when defendant
had called plaintiff's attention to the fact that he was
not complying with the terms of the F. H. A. on the lOth
Avenue property and the 21st of December, 1938, plaintiff made demand upon defendant for advancements on
both properties. With respect to the 16th East property,
over which the present litigation arises, the defendant
and appellant answered that there had been no F. H.
A. approval sufficient to justify making such advancements. Plaintiff persisted and finally an evidence of
inspection by the F. H. A., Exhibit No. "1," was received by defendant and a copy of Exhibit "3" was placed upon the property and another sent to this defendant.
Appellant refused to make advancements further, and
thereupon the plaintiff Swaner demanded that the mortgages on the 16th East property be released, and to this
demand defendant and appellant consented and agreed,
insisting, however, that it should be re-imbursed for the
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expenditures it had made for recording, inspection, service and insurance. Plaintiff refused to make these payments or any part thereof and brought this action for
cancellation of the mortgages and for certain damages,
including $2,000.00 for personal humiliation, embarrassment and mental distress, $10.00 for demurrage charges,
$40.00 for discounts unrealized, $250.00 for damage to the
building from the elements, and $200.00 attorney's fees.
The case was heard by a jury which, acting in an advisory
capacity, answered ten interrogatories propounded by
the trial judge and rendered an advisory verdict granting cancellation of the mortgage and certain damages,
amounting to $25.00 for loss of value due to the elements,
$40.00 for unrealized discounts, $10.00 for demurrage
charges and $200.00 attorney's fees.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Supplemental assignments of error have been filed
and served as follows:
12. The Court committed error prejudicial to appellant when he sustained plaintiff's objection to the following question: ''You didn't pay those expenses~''
(Tr. 100.)
13. The Court committed error prejudicial to the
defendant and appellant when it found, as it did, in paragraph 6 of its findings of fact, that plaintiff thereafter
demanded of the defe'ndant that it release the said mortgages of record and surrender to the plaintiff the said
promissory note ''which the defendant likewise refused
to do" for the reason that there is no evidence in the
record to justify such finding. (Tr. 56.)
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ARGUMENT
Heretofore appellant has assigned errors committed
by the Court during the trial of these proceedings, and for
the convenience of the Court this argument will be divided first into a discussion of the facts, and second, a
discussion of the law, and thus all of its assignments of
error will be considered.
The Court has found that the defendant below, appellant here, had refused to release the mortgage on the
property referred to as the 16th East property, which
are the only mortgages with which we are concerned directly in this action. (See abstract, page 20, particularly
findings six and ten.) It is the contention of the appellant
that no such testimony will be found in the record. The
amended answer of appellant (abstract page 11) contains
a paragraph numbered 7 which reads as follows :
"Upon receipt of such notification by defendant, plaintiff demanded the release of the mortgage described in plaintiff's complaint. Upon such
demand being made upon it, this defendant consented that such release of mortgage be made, and
informed the plaintiff that upon payment by him
to it of the expenses and outlay made by it on his
behalf, in connection with such loan, that said
loan would be immediately released.''
Reference to plaintiff's answer to defendant's counterclaim shows that in making such answer the plaintiff
set forth the following: (Abstract page 15.)
''Answering paragraph 7 plaintiff admits
that he demanded the release of the mortgage described in plaintiff's complaint and that the defendant refused to release said mortgage, except
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upon condition that the plaintiff pay to the defendant certain alleged costs and expenses claimed
by the defendant to have been incurred by it in
connection with said loan, and in this connection
plaintiff denies that the defendant was entitled
to any such payment of costs and expenses, as a
condition for the release of said mortgage.''
The testimony of the plaintiff at page 30 of the abstract shows the following upon cross examination of the
plaintiff:
Question: N o,~l at the time you made demand
for the release of this mortgage, the defendant
told you that it 'vould release immediately if you
would pay certain expenses it had incurred, didn't
l"t ~.

Answer : Yes.
It is true that there are certain conclusions of this
witness at various places in the record, but at no place is
there a denial of the fact that the defendant at all times
stood ready to release such mortgages upon payment by
.the plaintiff to the defendant of the costs and expenses
which it had incurred in his behalf, and it is undisputed
in the record that the defendant was perfectly willing
to release the plaintiff from the contract entered into on
November 14, 1938, and that it would discharge the mortgages upon being made "Thole on its expenditures in his
behalf. Upon this question, it would seem that a lengthy
discussion would not be needed because the record bears
out the contention of the defendant and appellant without
dispute, and the good faith of the appellant is evidenced
in its ·willingness expressed by it to release upon getting
.back its actual outlay. And what were the expenses
whieh had been incurred by it in behalf of the plaintiff:
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Recording, abstract fees, Federal Housing Administration fees and fire insurance. It is true that the Court
struck out of appellant's pleading the items above referred to and 'vould allo"'" no proof on the subject, but
this has been assigned as error. Appellant feels that the
Court 'Yas in error· in striking this portion of its pleading for the reason that these expenditures were made by
defendant at the request of plaintiff and for plaintiff's
benefit in conformity with the rules and regulations of
the Federal Housing Administration, and no commitment
could be secured from said administration without these
expenditures or ag-reement to make them when called
upon. The mortgage had to be recorded, the abstract of
title had to be prepared, and the Federal Housing Administration appraisal fees had to be paid; and certainly,
after the improvements were made upon the property,
insurance had. to be carried thereon.
Some question was raised that no tender of the insurance policy had been made to plaintiff and hence no
liability. Of course this must immediately appear to be
without foundation, because the policy was issued and
plaintiff knew it. The policy was made to the mortgagor
for the benefit of the mortgagee as its interest appeared,
and it must be manifest that when the mortgagee had
furnished no money upon the mortgage its interest would
be nothing, and if a fire had occurred the mortgagor
'vould have been the sole beneficiary. Why, then, should
not the mortgagor pay for the insurance policy which
was made entirely for his benefit and which would protect him at all times from its issue and even during the
trial of this cause f The mortgagee was in absolute
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good faith in asking for the return of the money expended
by it for the benefit of the plaintiff, and the Court's
refusal to allow proof of such obligation and his action
in striking that portion of the defendant's answer and
counterclaim 'vas prejudicial in the extreme to defendant.
Appellant feels that at no time during its relations
with the plaintiff in connection with the 16th East mortgage was there ever a compliance by the plaintiff with
the rules and regulations of the Federal Housing Administration and with the agreement entered into by the
plaintiff and defendant which would entitle the plaintiff to any advancements whatever. It is alleged by appellant ·and testified to again and again by the plaintiff
that his loan and any advancements were to be subject
to the rules and regulations of the Federal Housing Administration and subject to inspections made by that institution. The record shows (see plaintiff's complaint,
abstract page 2 and his testimony, abstract page 27) that
the plaintiff was to receive money, "10% when the first
floor joists were on, 15% when the roof was completed
* * * "
. .c\n
. inspection was made by the Federal Housing Administration on or about the 21st of December, 1938 and
a record of such inspection was made and sent to appellant (see Exhibit "1") and a photostatic copy of such
exhibit is made a part of this brief. A careful examination of the exhibit will show that there was an objection
to the concrete which never yet has been approved, at
least no evidence indicates such approval, that certain
portions of the construction were approved but it will

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
be noted that the floor and other construction above the
foundation is specifically marked as unacceptable, though
indicated as partially complete or in progress .
. At the same time that this inspection was made,

there appears to have been a piece of paper left at the
building 'vhich is marked Exhibit "3". A photostatic
cut of that document is also a part of this brief, and an
examination of the document will show that that refers
to exhibit 1 which sets the defects and indicates just what
is required and expressly sho,vs that approval is subject
to the correction of the defective work, and there is absolutely no other testimony in the record which shows that
then or at any time since has the F. H. A. ever approved
that defective work. It is true that plaintiff says the
floor was completed, but it is submitted that such statement is a self-serving declaration and can mean nothing
when a strict compliance on his part would be required
to entitle him to any advancement under the contract
between himself and appellant.
I

Edward 0. Anderson, a witness on behalf of the defendant, was called and qualified himself as Chief Architectural Supervisor in charge of the documents, records
and files of the F. H. A. corporation, and he recognized
the two exhibits herein referred to. Exhibit '' 1'' is
dated the same day that Exhibit "3" is dated, and it is
clear that Exhibit "3" is but a documentary evidence
that on that day a certain inspection was made which is
clearly evidenced by Exhibit "1," and it is inconceivable that Exhibit '' 3'' would have the effect of more widely approving the work done on the property than Exhibit
'' 1 '' which carries the demand for the correction of de-
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fective work, and on which the F. H. A. would hold appellant on its obligation to provide properly constructed
security.
It is submitted that with the inspection evidenced
by Exhibits "1" and "3," no such compliance with the
requirements of the contract between plaintiff and appellant had been had as would entitle plaintiff to an advancement of money thereunder.
The question of the $25.00 general damages which
was allowed to stand by the Court, after motion for new
trial had been made and presented, is in appellant's
opinion entirely without foundation or justification. The
only evidence supporting it in any sense is the testimony
of the plaintiff himself, and the wild judgments of the
witness A. J. Dean, who by his own testimony is a cement
man and is certainly not qualified to make judgments of
the type he was called upon to testify to. Witness his
testimony about the rusty nails (abstract page 36) and
compare that testimony with the facts presented in the
testimony of 0. C. Nielson (abstract page 45) and see
Exhibit '' 5, '' and then determine what reliance could be
put on even a guess by such witness. It is submitted that
no proof of any type worthy of the name was submitted
to substantiate the $25.00 damage, and the judgment
of the experts long in the building business, Buehner and
Nielson, clearly demonstrates that the building had not
suffered at all. In fact, careful reading of their testimony will indicate that the drying out process that the
building was subjected to was really an advantage rather
than a detriment. There is no evidence upon which findings 6, 7 and 10 can be justified.
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One of the noYel features presented in this case was
the allowance by the Court of $200.00 attorney's fees for
the bringing of this action. The general rule is that no
recovery can be had as damages for costs and expenses
of litigation or expenditure of counsel fees, unless special provision is made for such allowance (a) by stat_ute,
(b) by contract, or (c) as exemplary damages growing
out of wrongful and malicious acts and in some cases out
of wanton or malicious injury or gross negligence or
fraud. It is the belief of the appellant that none of these
prerequisites are to be found in the case at bar.
In 29 Fed. 2nd 78, the Court says :
"No right of action for damages exists at
common law for failure to satisfy mortgage or to
release or discharge a lien or other claim against
property.''
The State of Utah has not been called upon to pass
on this question directly, but it does have a statute, Section 78-3-8, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, with reference to the release of mortgages, which reads as follows:
,, 'If the mortgagee ;fails to discharge or release
any mortgage after the same has been fully satisfield, he shall be liable to the mortgagor for double the damages resulting from such failure. Or
the mortgagor may bring an action against the
mortgagee to compel the discharge or release of
the mortgage after the same has been satisfied;
and the judgment of the Court must be that the
mortgagee discharge or release the mortgage and
pay the mortgagor the costs of suit, and all damages resulting from such failure.''
The above quotation is the only expression in the Utah
Statutes with respect to attorney's fees in connection
with mortgages.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
An early Utah decision held such a penalty statute
unconstitutional.
Openshaw vs. Haflin, 68 Pac. 138, 24 Utah
426.
In Utah the question of attorney's fees as damages
has been before the Court but rarely, and for the most
part these pronouncements grew out of attachment suits.
vVhile it cannot be said that such cases are directly in
point, yet it does appear to appellant that the expression
of the Court does indicate clearly that unless attorney's
fees are provided for by statute, not only in attachment
cases but in others, this Court is rather definitely on
record against it.
St.. Joseph Stock Yards Co. vs. Love, et al,
195 Pac. 305, 57 Utah 450 (see especially pages
463-465) wherein the Court says :
'' vVe do not wish to be understood as holding, or even as intimating, that in a case where the
":--hole defense is directed against the attachment
and to show that the same was wrongful, as was
the case in Whitney vs. Brownewell, supra, and in
similar cases, attorney's fees may not be allowed,
but what we contend for is that where there is
no motion assailing the attachment or no plea in
abatement, as in Missouri, and a. trial upon the
issues presented by the pleadings results in favor
of the defendant, then the rule which is applicable
to all cases prevails, namely, that, unless there
is a statute expressly authorizing the allowance
of attorney's fees, none can be awarded by the
Court.''
''There is, therefore, no reason why Courts
should depart from the salutary rule which authorizes the allowance of costs and expenses that
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are provided by the usual so-called cost statutes.
In addition to that, no costs should be allowed except "'"hen expressly authorized by statute. The
Courts of this state are always open to all for the
redress of grievanee8 and the protection of legal
rig·hts, and in our judgment they should refrain
from allo,Ying the imposition of costs and expenses upon the losing party except such as are
provided for by statute and such as by the concensus of the opinions of the Courts by long and
uniform usage have been allowed in certain cases
as necessary for the protection of legal rights.
In our judgment such is not the case here.''
(Our italics.)
The text books and encyclopedias have considered
the question of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
as damages, and, except when the items fall within the
subdivisions above referred to, are unanimous in disallowing such claims.
17 C. J. 807, Section 133lays down the rule as
follows:

''Expenses of Litigation and Attorneys' Fees.
(a) In General. Apart from the sums allowable
and taxed as costs, there can, as a general rule, be
no recovery as damages of the costs and expenses
of litigation, or expenditures for counsel fees.
In cases of civil injury or breach of contract, in
which there is no fraud, willful negligence, or
malice, the Courts have considered that an award
of the costs in the action is sufficient to cover
expenses of litigation and make no allowance for
time, indirect loss, and annoyance.
''By statute in some jurisdictions provision
is made for the allowance of the expenses of litigation as damages in certain cases. ''Contractual
provisions. Expenditures made for attorney's
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fees in an action based on a contract containing a
stipulation for such fees are in the nature of special damages incidental to the breach· of the contract, which, according to the· terms of the contract, are to be compensated for in addition to a
recovery of the principal sum due.''
Sedgwick on Damages, 9th Edition, Section 299,
page 463, announces the rule as follows :
''We have seen that in order to recover complete compensation, the plaintiff should, in case
he is successful, be allowed the expenses of litigation. Nevertheless, the general rule is that
counsel fees are not recoverable as damages. The
law a'vards to the successful party his taxable
costs, but the fees which he pays to counselors
are not taken into consideration. (Citing cases.)
In general the law considers the taxed costs as
the only damages which a party sustains by the
defense of a suit against him and these he recovers
by judgment in his favor."
Section 233 of the same volume on page 466 is as
follows:

" * * * It is, however, firmly established that
counsel fees cannot be included in compensatory
damages, at least where there was no malice
or oppression.'' (Citing many cases.)
The same work, section 234, page 470, reads:
'' * ·* * And accordingly, by the better opinion, no inquiry into counsel fees should be allowed,
even in those actions ·of tort in which the jury
may give exemplary damages."
(Our Italics.).
In American Juris prudence, Volume 15, Section 154, page 550, the rule is laid down to the
same effect.
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There can be no question but that exemplary damages cannot be claimed in this action, because it is neither pleaded nor proved.
Rugg Ys. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 117 Pac. 54.
Falkenberg Ys. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 264 Pac.
1008.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma considered the
question here presented, and in Pittsburg M. & Investment Company Ys. Cook, 1 Pac. 2nd 665 says:
''The remedy and .measure of damages, as
provided by Section 6242, C. 0. S. 1921, for failure to release a mortgage is exclusive. Damages
thereby provided, cannot be recovered, nor can
recovery be had 'vhen provisions of the statute
have not been complied with.''
Morrill vs. Title Guaranty Company, 94
Wash. 258, 163 Pac. 733.
Stapley vs. Rogers, 25 Ari~. 308, 216 Pac.
1072, in the course of an opinion disallowing attorney's fees the Court says·:
''It is difficult to determine upon what theory
the Court entered judgment for $75.00 attorney's
fees. The item is not taxed as costs and there is
no allegation in the answer upon which to base it
nor is there any evidence to support such a charge.
We know of no rule nor of any statute that would
authorize the allowance of attorney's fees to the
winning party to be taxed against the loser. * * *
Since no law nor authority exists that would
authorize the entry of judgment for attorney's
fees, it was error for the Court to enter such a
judgment.''
Scurich vs. Ryan (California) 113 Pac. 123
is another attorney's fee case, and in the course
of the opinion is found the following: ''By con-
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ceding that he is entitled to a judgment, and leaving out attorney's fees, which are not a proper
element of damages, (Miller vs. Kehoe, 107 Cal.
340, 40 Pac. 485 ; Sanger vs. Ryan, 122 Cal. 52,
54 Pac. 522) it must be held that the verdict is
excessive.''
Boob vs. Hall, (California) 40 Pac. 117, is a
case wherein an attorney's fee was attempted in
the foreclosure of a mortgage. There was no
provision for attorney's fees in the contract, and
in considering an assignment of errors based
upon the allowance of $400.00 for counsel services the Court said :
"Neither the prayer in the complaint for
its allowance nor the avertment of the amount
\vhich would be reasonable can supply the necessity of a direct averment that an attorney's fee
had been agreed to be paid by the mortgagor. The
motion to dismiss the appeal is denied, and the
cause is remanded to the superior Court, with directions to modify the judgment by excluding
therefrom the amount included therein for attorney's fees, and, \Vhen so modified, the judgment
will stand affirmed.''
Avalon Construction Corporation vs. Kirch
Holding Company (N.Y.) 175 N. E. 651. In the
course of the opinion, is found the following:
''Another i tern occurring in the bill of expenses
occasioned to defendant is the item for $3,000.00
for legal services. This item chiefly consists of
charges made or to be made by defendant's own
attorney for services in conducting this litigation. The legal charges which the plaintiff must
pay to the defendant in this action, if any, will
be comprehended in defendant's bill of costs.
There is no basis for including them in the damages which the defendant may recover. Other
items appearing in the expense account may or
may not be recovered.''
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A most enlightening discussion of the subject in
hand is found in the case of J. Abraham Guay, Executor,
vs. Brotherhood Building Association, (New Hampshire)
177 Atl. 409. This 'vas an action to have the stockholders of a certain domestic corporation adjudged liable for
its note given to plaintiff's testatrix. All of the questions, except that of damages recoverable in recoupment
because of premature foreclosure by the testatrix of the
mortgage securing the note, were disposed of in a former
opinion. The case was sent back to the master who made
two further reports in accordance with which the Court
entered judgment, and in the course of its opinion is
found the following discussion with respect to attorney's
fees:
''The second exception is to the refusal of
the master to allow as damages the counsel fees
incurred by the defendants in maintaining their
rights against the premature foreclosure by the
plaintiff's testatrix. It is not enough to say that
the foreclosure was wrongful, illegal, or tortious.
Ordinarily, one suffering from such a wrong cannot recover the counsel fees incurred in resistance
of it, but will be limited to the attorney fee allowed
by statute to be taxed as costs. * * * ''
''Counsel fees other than statutory costs have
been allowed under certain classifications. They
include:
'' (1) Cases of enforcement of judicial authority, as where misconduct of a party amounting to
contempt of court has caused the opposing party
to incur counsel fees (Barber vs. George R. Jones
Shoe Co., 80 N. H. 507, 511, 512, 120 A. 80), or
where a person retains possession of property
after a judicial determination of the wrongful
character of his possession, thus forcing the party
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wronged to the expense of further proceedings to
recove;r possession or otherwise enforce his rights.
Even in the second proceeding to enforce rights
judicially declared in a prior action, the wronged
party is not allowed anything for counsel fees in
the first litigation. His only right as to counsel
fees in the earlier proceeding is to have the statutory costs taxed therein.
"(2) Counsel fees other than those permitted
by statute may be allowed by the court as the
price of terms. Thus they may be taxed against
the applicant for a new trial in some cases as
ternis for the granting of the motion. And a party
guilty of misconduct in consequence of which a
mistrial is ordered may properly be required to
pay counsel fees to the opposing party as the
price of another trial.
'' ( 3) Counsel fees may be allowed as damages in cases where there is contractual liability.
Such liability may exist where the contract is
to be interpreted as expressly providing for their
payment, as in injunction bonds.''
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. vs. Evatt Const.
Co. (Mass.) 152 N. E. 715.
''The contention of the contractor that it is
entitled to be awarded counsel fees incurred cannot be sustained. It is a general rule that taxable
costs recovered by the prevailing party are considered full compensation for the expense of conducting the litigation, even if such costs are in
fact wholly inadequate. Barnard vs. Poor, 21
Pick, 378; Guild vs. Guild, 2 Mete. 229, Henry vs.
Davis, 123 Mass. 345. Notwithstanding this genera] rule it has been held that there are certain
exceptions. In Inhabitants of Westfield vs. Mayo,
122 Mass. 100, 23 Am. Rep. 292, an action of tort
to rec?ver the amount of a judgment paid by the
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plaintiff to one who had sustained personal injuries on a highway which the plaintiff was bound
to keep in repair, it was held that the defendant,
having negligently created the obstruction in the
way, and having been notified to defend the action, was liable to the plaintiff for the amount of
the judgment, and also for the reasonable expenses of the suit including counsel fees. It was
there said, at page 105:
Sears vs. Nahant, (Mass.) 102 N. E. 491. In
this case the Court considered the question of
attorney's fees and made several distinctions, but
concluded that attorney's fees were not proper
charges and sustained the ruling of the lower
Court.
1
] itzgerald vs. Heady, (Mass.) 113 N. E. 844.
Brown vs. Kidwell, (Kansas) 244 Pac. 236.
Spencer vs. Murphy, (Colo.) 41 Pac. 841.
Flanders vs. Tweed, 82 U. S. 450, 21 L. Ed.
203.
It clearly appears from the evidence introduced on
the part of plaintiff that upon his failure to agree with
appellant he demanded a discharge of his mortgages,
and that at once appellant agreed that such discharge
would come immediately upon payment to it of its costs
and expenses, and appellant believes that in view of
the fact that it was in good faith entitled to a return of
the expenditure made by it on behalf of plaintiff that no
damage in the nature of attorney's fees could properly be
ass·essed against it, and that the trial Court was in error
when it allowed any proof to be made as to attorn·ey's
fees in the light of the claims of appellant which were
clearly made in good faith:, and which appellant pleaded
in its answer and which the court struck out, thereby
prejudicing appellant.
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Plaintiff has relied very extensively upon the case
of Kelly vs. Narregang_Investment Company, 41 S.Dak.
222, 170 N. W. 131, and this case seems to be the base from
which has grown the consideration of attorney's fees
in cases of the type of the one at bar.
rrhe case of Mathieu vs. Boston, also a South Dakota
case, found_ in 216 N. W. 361, and decided eleven years
later than the Kelly case, considers the question of good
faith on the part of the mortgagee in demanding further
and additional compensation. This was an action
brought by plaintiffs and appellants, as owners of certain lands mortgaged to secure a debt of $8,000.00 to respondent. After certain payments had been made thereon, $1,600.00 was tendered in full satisfaction of the
mortgage, which was refused because the respondent
believed that he was entitled to a sum in excess of $1,800.00. At the trial, the Court instructed the jury that
the section of the South Dakota statute providing for
damages and penalties for failure to release a mortgage
when full payment was made did not apply where the
holder of the mortgage refused to discharge, relying in
good faith, even though mistakenly, upon some supposed
legal rights. In the Mathieu case the defendant believed
he was entitled to more money. The Court held otherwise but, notwithstanding that fact, sustained the judgment of the lower Court, denying all damages, including
attorney fees, and in the course of the opinion, referring
to the section of the statute providing for penalties and
damages for failure to release, says :
''The foregoing section is almost identical in
language with subdivision 6 of Section 1735 of
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the Civil Code of Dakota Territory, quoted by
Justice Carland in Kronebusch vs. Raumin, 6
Dak. 243, 42 N. W. 656. Therein our territorial
Supreme Court said: 'If, before he (the mortgagee) is satisfied of the correctness of the
amount, a demand is made upon him for a discharge of the mortgage, and he refuses, and action
is brought by the mortgagor for the penalty, we
should hold that, if he could show that his refusal
was in good faith, and made in the honest belief
that the mortgage was not entitled to be discharged, he would not be liable to the penalty, as the refusal of the mortgagee or his representative, under subdivision 6 of our statute, must be intentional and willful in order to incur the penalty.'
''True, the foregoing quotation from Kronebusch vs. Raumin, supra, is mere dicta; but,
in Jones on Mortgages, 7th ed. vol. 2, Section 991,
the learned author states that, 'the mortgagee is
not bound, upon tender of payment, to determine
doubtful questions at his peril, and he is not generally held liable to the statutory penalty if his
refusal is made in good faith and in the honest
belief that he is not bound to accept the tender.'
' ' See also Section 982 of the Title, ' Mortgages,' 41 C. J. 819.
"It is urged by appellant that this construction of our statute calls for reading into it a proviso not contained within its language. This objection has heretofore been considered by the
courts. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in
Schlliilacher vs. Falter, 113 Wis. 563, 89 N. W.
485, in construing Section 2256 of the Revised
Statutes of Wisconsin says: 'Although that section does not provide, in terms, that the failure to
discharge must be a willful or malicious one, it
is very evident that it was not enacted to punish
honest mistakes. A statute in almost the iden-
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tical language. of. our. section has been construed
many times by. the Supreme, Court of Michigan;
and the substance of the decisions in that state
is that where there is no intentional wrong in the
refusal to discharge, but rather, a reliance in good
faith upon some supposed legal right, the penalty
will not be imposed, even· though the supposed
right may be found not to exist.' "
It is submitted that if the trial Court had not been
imbued with the zeal of a crusader to award damages
to the plaintiff' and had been· willing to listen to the
testimony which appellant would have. produced and
had not stricken from its answer its allegations upon
which such proof 'vould have been admitted, the Court
would have been presented with the same type of testimoney of. which the Court in the Mathieu case says:

''The merest reading of the testimony in the
present case shows that the defendant, in refusing
to discharge, 'vas acting in the honest belief that
his mortgage was still unpaid and under the advice of counsel. ' '
See also Parkes vs. Parker, 57 Mich. 57, 23
N. W. 458.·
Haubert vs. Haworth, 9 Phil. (Pa.) 123.
American National Bank vs. Jordan, 123
Okla. 165, 254 P. 706.
First National Bank· vs. Elam, 126 Okla. 93,
258 Pac. 892.
Myer vs .. Hart, 40 Mich. 517, 29 Am. R. 553.
Penalty under sec. 6369 for failure to release a mortgage should not be imposed for failure to release a
mortgage which· has been satisfied, where facts indicate
a .substantial controversy.
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Harding, et ux, vs. Home Investment & Savings Company, 49 Idaho 64, 286 Pac. 920.
In the rase of Smith vs. Colson, 31 Okla., 703,
123 Pac. 149, it is said:
dIn an action by the mortgagor against a
mortgagee to recoYer under Section 3057, Ind. Ter.
Statute, for the mortgagee's failure to acknowledge satisfaction of a mortgage as required by
-said statute, it is a competent defense for the
mortg·agee to show that there was a controversy
between him and the mortgagor as to whether
the mortgage debt had been paid, and upon substantial grounds and in good faith, he refused to
satisfy the mortgage, believing that the mort.gage debt or part thereof had not been paid, and
that he is entitled to recover same; and where
there is evidence tending to support this issue of
defense, it was error for the Court to refuse an
instruction thereon, correctly stating the law applicable to such issue.''
In the Colson case the Court cited with approval:

w.

Burrows vs. Bangs, 34 Mich. 304.
Scott vs. Field, 75 Ala. 419.
Schumacher vs. Falter, 113 Wis. '563, 89 N.
485.

The Burrows case is particularly interesting because
the opinion was written by Judge Cooley, who disposes
·of the question of damages and attorney's fees as follows:
"But as there has been an honest difference
of opinion between these parties regarding their
rights, we do not think the defendant is subject
to the statutory penalty for not discharging the
mortgage.''

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
Continental Bank vs. Kowalsky, (Mich.) 225 N. W.
496 held that where a mortgagee refused tender of an
amount due on a mortgage, did not act in bad faith or
without an honest belief that the amount did not satisfy
the lien, the penalty provided in Section 11745, Compiled
Laws of 1915, did not apply.
See also Shelton vs. Wilson, 264 N. W. 854.
McQueen vs. First National Bank of W etumpka, (Ala.) 160 So. 723.
In Stumph vs. vVheat Belt Building & Loan Ass'n
of Pratt, 148 Kan. 25, 79 Pac. 2nd 896, the Court holds
that a mortgagor, suing to compel a mortgagee to release a real estate mortgage, was not entitled as a matter of right or statute to a judgment for statutory penalty or for attorney's fees, notwithstanding that the
debt secured was paid and the mortgage was subject
to be released where there was a bona fide controversy
between the parties as to whether the debt had in fact
been paid, and in arriving at this conclusion in the course
of its opinion the Court said :
''With reference to the cross appeal, whether
the appellee "\vas entitled to statutory damages and
attorney's fees depended in large part on there
being bona fide controversy between the parties.
The trial Court held against the association but
that did not mean there 'vas no claim in good
faith by it. The controversy grew out of a matter on which other Courts had decided both ways
and on which this Court had not ruled. We think
that under Parkhurst vs. National Bank, 53
Kan. 136, 35 Pac. 1116, the trial Court's ruling
was correct. ''
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The Supreme Court of Oregon had occasion to pass
upon the same question presented, and in the case of
Knudson YS. Knudson, 275 Pac. 663, it was decided that
a refusal to enter satisfaction of a mortgage did not create liability for $100.00 in addition to actual damages
under Oregon I.ja"r 9891, and at the same time laid down·
the rule, which seems to be universal in this line of cases,
that a statute providing for such damages is a penal
statute and is to be strictly construed.
Respondent is relying· upon the statute of Utah above
quoted to justify the judgment in his behalf for $200.00
attorney's fees ·and has cited the Kelly case supra and the
Cocking case in 1iontana in 213 Pac. 594, as justification
for its position. AR authority for its claim that any
damage sustained may contain attorney's fees, we have
always felt that mandantus was a little different type
of procedure, and we are inclined to the belief that even
the mandamus decision in Utah in the Creer case, 96
Utah 1:- 80 Pac. 2nd 914, is distinguishable for that reason. It would take a hardy advocate, indeed, to justify
any other decision than that which was rendered in the
case of Cornelius vs. United States Building & Loan
Association, 50 Idaho 1, 292 Pac. 243, one of the cases
upon which respondent relies. This was the case involving usury, and of course included not only the possibility
of damage through violation of the law of the State of
Idaho with respect to the rate of interest, but also carried the question of damage for failure to release, and
no question there is presented as to good faith in such
refusal.
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Appellant believes that at no time was the plaintiff
justified in bringing the action which he brought, because appellant V{as always ready and willing to release
the mortgages upon being made whole for its actual expenses, and an outstanding evidence of the unfairness
of plaintiff's position is the fact that he was willing
to accept the benefit secured to him through the insurance procured by appellant and yet unwilling to reimburse appellant for the premiums paid in his behalf, not
to mention the other expenditures 'vhich have heretofore
been recited, all ·of which were incurred at plaintiff's
request.
Appellant therefore submits:
1. When respondent demanded release of his mortgages,, there was no longer any obligation from appellant
to him to advance him money, even if proper compliance
with F. H. A. regulations had been had, and approval
of construction to agreed degrees had and evidenced.
2. There is no damage sho"\vn to respondent supported by any substantial or responsible evidence.
3. Respondent here, plaintiff below, did not comply 'vith his contract in any respect, and at no time was
his construction at the 16th East house sufficiently advanced to entitle him to any advancements, and there
was no F. H. A. inspection and approval which ever
would have justified appellant in giving him any money
under the alleged terms of the agreement between the
parties.
4. .Lt\.ppellant believes that it was honestly entitled
as a condition precedent to the release of mortgages to
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demand and receive from respondent Swaner the money
"'"hich it had expended in his behalf and for his benefit,
and that the action of the trial Court in refusing to allow
it to plead and prove such expenditures was highly prejudicial to it.
5. That prejudicial error having been committed
against appellant by the trial Court in its rulings at the
trial on the pleadings and on the admission of evidence,
and in entering judgment against appellant and in favor
of respondent and in refusing to grant appellant a new
trial, the judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully. submitted,
DAN B. SHIELDS,
Attorney for Appellant.
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ipleted::: »:u passed the ____________{___________________________ inspection.
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be more explicitly set forth in a Compliance Inspection Report, copy of
~ch will shortly be mailed to applicant mortgagee.
Corrected items must be left uncovered and visible for reinspection and
sible recorre·ction, else .the removal of coveringt)d concealing materials may

required.
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"-- By -------~--<fuiii.~)---------· Impe~or.
------------~ _ --------------~--------------' Chtef Archttectural Supervuor.

~I JOlt FHA INSPECTOR:
ThJs form shall be completed in duplicate. The original shall be posted conspicuously at.the site of
ltructlon. Duplicate copy shall be forwarded to thtt IDSUring Office with Compliance InspectioD
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,._umKe....,..
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COMPLIANCE INSPECTION REPORT

ewaner

____§_2-00:-::'4~3...:..;72~--_J

Type of Inspection:

(Serial number)

D First Required. 0 Second Required. D Third Required. 0 Additional or Optional. 0 Repair,
f) Alternate Fii-st.
Property address E .fid.u...o!'-1.6__E....,.N.&--a.t:...l7••.S.oll.th City ______ ,_C.E~t~; ke
State
Name of contractor _____________.o_wne.r.________________________ _

--..w.J~.Sw..J~

NOTE.-The term "approved drawings and speci.fi.cations," used below means those drawings and specifications whifi
approved by the Federal Housing Administration at the time Commitment for Insurance was issued in the case of the a
bered application~ together with subsequent changes approved by the Chief Underwriter.

WORK COMPLETED
X Indicates work entirely completed. vIndicates work in progress or partially complete.
CROSS OUT WORK NOT REQUmED

0
~Footings
D
Gt Foundation, walls, piers D
0 Backfill
D
Ill Floor construction
D
111 Exterior walls
0
0 Roof construction
D
D Roofing in place
D
0 Sheet metal
D
0 Partitions
D
0 Plumbing (rough-in)
D
[2g Excavation

0

No~e

Heating (rough-in)
Elec. wiring (rough-in)
Insulation
Septic tank
Basement floor slab
Lathing and plaster base
Plumbing fixtures
Tile work
Plastering
Heating~fixtures

INCOMPLET~

D Floor finishing

0 Grading
D Trim, doors, sash OWalks
0 Weatherstrip
D Driveway

D
0
D
D
D
0
D

Hardware
Calking
Interior paint
Decorating
Elec. fixtures
Exterior paint
Screens
D Detached garage

D Sodding
0 Utilities installed an
proved by authoritiel

0 Utilities connected ·
0 Work satisfactorily com

,

and building is ready~
cupancy (attach two
graphic prints)

WORK OR DEFECTIVE 1.\IATERIALS
(LIST ITEMS, D' ANY)

Concrete to be checked i'or f'reez.inJ a!'ter it hc..f: .1ad JftOre time to se.t up.

How does this incomplete work or defective materials affect the cost estimate or rating _of physica~ security?l
---.,..--'-------~

~None

VARIATIONS FROM APPROVED DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS
(ALSO INCLUDE OMITTED ITEMS)

I

How do these variations affect the cost estimate or rating of physical security?

.I

Have you ever inspected this property before, other than F. H. A. inspections? --~~---and for whom --------------·-------------------------------------------------·------ ·

CERTIFICATION: I, the undersigned, have read Section 612 (a) of the Natio~al Housing Act, as amended, and do here
tify that I have carefully inspected this property, that I have noted above all defective work and variations from appl'\lvedthiJ
and specifications which have come to my attention, that to the best of my--knowledge and belief the statements made 'in
are correct, end t~t I have no personal interest, present or prospective, in the property, applicant, or proceeds of mo~ge.

.

.,

(Date) ----------~c c:~~~:l-..~~1.--~~~~~----Examined this date.
(Date) -----Beeetl~i:.-2-;---l$58-----.Construction finally approved·----~-----,
·

(Signed)

.

.... -

-·

(Date)

-=-------------.•
Chief Underwriter.

(Signed) --------------------~----------~
,
· . .Inspector 0 Staff. 0 Fee. 0 Per

0 Construction approved to date
0 Construction not approved
.
Gl Construction approved to date subject to correct!
defective work
D Additi~on~a~·lS.PJ~ioli-~·
D Con
·

·

2051. Compliance Inspection Report

, . _ . ~·nc.
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